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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Fit for Command


Military Leadership Attributes for Small Wars

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Military Studies

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AY 2012-2013

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Executive Summary

Title: Fit for Command: Military Leadership Attributes for Small Wars.

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Thesis: This study will show that, although most leadership attributes are timeless, military leaders who are more adept in the seven leadership attributes adaptability, judgment, sociability, resoluteness & persuasiveness, courage, empathy, and independence, are more likely to be successful at the tactical and operational level during small wars. These military leaders can quickly adapt, make the right assessments, easily establish relationships with other key actors, effectively negotiate, deal with risk and ethical challenges, handle cultural and social issues, and operate in a decentralized environment. They are therefore more capable to deal with the constantly changing characteristics of the small wars operating environment.

Discussion: The characteristics of small wars are significantly more complex than the characteristics of conventional war. This puts greater demand on military leadership, both at the tactical and the operational level. The diversity of tasks and threats, primacy of politics, and the decentralized nature of small wars have implications for both junior and senior leaders. The fundamental leadership attributes are timeless and common for both conventional and small wars. However, since the characteristics of small wars differ substantially from conventional warfare military leaders require to be more adept in certain attributes in order to be successful during small wars.

Conclusion: Case studies and a leadership questionnaire confirm that military leadership plays a crucial role, at both the tactical and operational level, in the prevention of (humanitarian) disasters and escalation of violence during small wars. Seven leadership attributes have been identified that are crucial during small wars. These are adaptability, judgment, persuasiveness & resoluteness, sociability, courage, empathy, and independence. Military leaders who are more adept in these attributes are more likely to be successful during small wars. Not all leaders will rate high in all seven attributes, but the extent of their adeptness in these attributes will determine their ability to perform successfully. Knowledge & experience are identified as supporting skills that influence the effectiveness and success of military leaders during small wars.

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Preface

From 1994 until mid 1995 a Dutch battalion (Dutchbat) was deployed to Srebrenica (Bosnia) in order to safeguard the enclave against hostilities between the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims. Within the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission the task of the Dutch battalion was to protect the population of Srebrenica, create the conditions for humanitarian relief, and demilitarize the Muslims.

In July 1995 Bosnian Serbs attacked the safe area Srebrenica after months of intimidation and obstruction. The Dutch battalion was unable to protect Srebrenica and on July 11 the enclave fell into the hands of the Serbs. Within a few days the first indications surfaced that a humanitarian tragedy had taken place in Srebrenica. After the initial relief that all Dutch soldiers arrived safely in Zagreb, it became soon clear that the Bosnian Serbs had killed about 7,500 Muslim men.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tom Karremans, the Dutch battalion commander, was blamed for the weak resistance by the Dutch battalion, and according to the public opinion he should have done more to protect the Muslim population. As in most peace support operations this incident was severely influenced by the weak UN mandate, political disagreements, and contradictory orders from higher headquarters.

Several investigations concluded that the performance of Karremans and the Dutch battalion stood the test of legal criticism.¹ Also, it should be absolutely clear that only General Mladic and the Bosnian Serbs are responsible for the genocide that took place in Srebrenica. Despite these facts I have always wondered if different military leadership would have prevented this humanitarian disaster. This has led to this study in which I want to identify the leadership attributes and traits that are crucial for military leaders during small wars.

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1. Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War and throughout the Cold War western militaries have been organized, trained, and equipped to fight the next large, conventional war. When the Soviet Union collapsed the prospect of total war vanished, and the international security situation has significantly changed. Instead of the hoped-for era of peace the world faces a period characterized by global disorder, civil wars, failed states, ethnic conflicts, and humanitarian disasters.

1.1 Small Wars

During the last two decades the majority of conflicts were considered Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and included all types of military employment short of major conventional warfare. Examples include humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, intervention, crisis response, peace support operations, counterinsurgency, anti-piracy operations, deterrence, stabilization operations, limited contingency operations, enforcing exclusion zones, and Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.²

MOOTW is no longer a formal doctrinal term, and currently there is no new formal term that covers this wide spectrum of operations. The term that most closely defines all these operations is 'Small Wars'. Small wars are defined as "operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation."³ According to the U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, these operations may vary from demonstrative operations to military intervention in the fullest sense, short of war. Small wars are not limited in size, or in their cost in property, resources, or lives. According to this definition

humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peace support operations can be considered small wars. Therefore, the term small wars will be used to label the full spectrum of operations short of major conventional war throughout this paper.

1.2 Scope

During all small wars structural factors play an important role in the outcome of the operation. Clausewitz's premise that war is a continuation of politics by other means surely applies to small wars.⁴ Also, the legal basis for small wars might be a resolution from the UN Security Council (UNSC), and such operations are therefore influenced by the UN mandate. These structural factors are not within the scope of this study. This paper assesses the role military leaders play in a small war operation both at the tactical and operational level.

1.3 Leadership Theory

There are several ways to define leadership. Leadership-theorist Ralph Stogdill pointed out that there are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are people who have tried to define it.⁵ There are also several different approaches or frameworks to analyze leadership. The trait approach stands out among the others because it focuses exclusively on the leader and not on the followers.⁶ Stogdill conducted research on traits from 1904 to 1947 and from 1948 to 1970. According to Stogdill, "leaders in one situation may not necessarily be leaders in another situation."⁷ In other words, a leader who might be successful in a given situation might fail in a different situation. When this principle is applied to military leadership, it implies that the required leadership attributes are likely to depend on the characteristics of the conflict.

General Charles C. Krulak (USMC) stated, "While it is true that leadership fundamentals are timeless, the method of application varies with every scenario and with each individual."⁸ Based on the different leadership theories and principles that were analyzed in Appendix A it

should be noted that the foundation of good leadership is timeless. However, leadership form, style, and requirements change depending on the situation.

Seven leadership attributes will be analyzed in this paper, utilizing the trait approach. The case studies and leadership questionnaire focus on western military leaders and are not focused on a specific military organization (i.e. the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps or United States Marine Corps). Therefore, there is also no single source for the definitions of these seven leadership attributes, and the attributes will be described based on the analysis of different academic definitions.

1.4 Thesis

Over the past twenty years the outcome of small wars have been mixed, and in all cases the military leadership played a crucial role in the outcome. Successful military leaders were able to switch from conventional warfare to the new, complex security environments. Other leaders were unable to understand and adapt to the new security environment often causing a catastrophic failure.

This study will show that, although most leadership attributes are timeless, military leaders who are more adept in the seven leadership attributes adaptability, judgment, sociability, resoluteness & persuasiveness, courage, empathy, and independence, are more likely to be successful at the tactical and operational level during small wars. These military leaders can quickly adapt, make the right assessments, easily establish relationships with other key actors, effectively negotiate, deal with risk and ethical challenges, handle cultural and social issues, and operate in a decentralized environment. They are therefore more capable to deal with the constantly changing characteristics of the small wars operating environment.

1.5 Method

This paper begins with an analysis of the characteristics of conventional war and small wars in order to identify the major differences between the operating environments. The paper will then analyze the seven leadership attributes that are identified as being crucial for military leaders during small wars.

The literature on small wars that is used for the case studies (see overview in Appendix B) mainly focuses on operations in the 1990's and early 21st century. In order to include recent small wars, a leadership questionnaire was sent to military leaders with recent experience during these types of operations. Twenty-seven questionnaires were received back; the ranks of the respondents varied from major to lieutenant general. The respondents were predominantly from western nations, including the United States, the Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Spain. They held billets from platoon and company commander to battalion commander, staff officer, commander of a training team, task force commander, division commander, and Military Assistant to the UN Secretary General. The questionnaire is shown in Appendix C. The results of the questionnaire were entered into a database in order to facilitate analysis, and Appendix D shows the results in charts. The detailed analysis of the data is conducted in Appendix E.

2. Characteristics of Small Wars

General Krulak described the contemporary security environment using the metaphor of the Three-Block War.⁹ This metaphor illustrates a situation in which military forces are handing out humanitarian relief supplies on one block, separating warring factions on a second block, and are involved in a full-scale kinetic contact on the third block. In a small war environment the military has to be skilled and ready to perform traditional warfighting tasks, and be able to perform other tasks significantly different from conventional warfighting.

General Krulak also introduced the Strategic Corporal concept.¹⁰ He argues that during small wars Marines and soldiers will operate in a decentralized environment very likely without direct supervision and far away from senior leadership. Under those circumstances junior leaders will face a bewildering array of challenges and threats. In order to succeed under these demanding circumstances they need confidence, judgment, and strength of character. Not only will they operate under great pressure, but also all their decisions will be subject to harsh scrutiny of both the media and public opinion. The on-the-scene junior leader is the symbol of international policy, and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but also the operational and strategic levels. His actions can directly impact the outcome of the larger operation, hence the term Strategic Corporal.

Both conventional and small wars are aimed at achieving national interests. However, during conventional war the military leaders at the tactical and operational level are mainly focused on the application of military power, whereas during small wars they need to be able to apply all elements of national power in order to deter war, promote peace, and create stability. British Army General Mike Jackson uses the analogy of a rope to describe small wars; “The provision of security is only one strand; the other strands are political progress, humanitarian aid,

demobilization of the factions' armies, reconstruction and economic progress. Once the strands are woven together, the rope is stronger than the sum of its parts."¹¹ British Army General Michael Rose stressed that, "In war, a military commander will always attempt to retain the initiative, in peacekeeping [one of the small wars operations] this is rarely possible. Command of a peacekeeping mission is infinitely more challenging."¹² Both General Jackson and General Rose noted that the characteristics of small wars are more challenging than conventional war.

Conventional war is a conflict between two or more states, driven by political goals. Political considerations are important, but are only of influence to senior leaders at the operational and strategic level. Conventional military forces fight the campaigns and battles, with more or less comparable organizations, weapons, and equipment. The battlefield is linear with a clear distinction between friendly and enemy forces and terrain. Combatants are recognizable and are expected to adhere to the law of war. The desired endstate is relatively easy to define.

Small wars are mostly conflicts within failed states with limited or no governance. Often the intended objective is hard to define, and almost never focused on the hostile forces. These operations are very sensitive to political considerations, and often the military is a key player but not the only one or necessarily the most important. Indeed these conflicts involve a wide range of actors such as multinational military forces, hostile elements, local security forces (military and police), warlords and criminals, local population, interagency elements, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and media. Combatants are not always recognizable as they easily blend in with the local population. Often combatants are just children. In an environment with poor governance and limited rule of law, military forces are often also tasked to operate as constabulary forces. Operations are predominantly conducted in heavily populated urban areas. The area of operations is nonlinear, and units are widely dispersed. Military commanders and their forces are responsible for a wide range of activities varying from

humanitarian assistance to diplomacy, negotiations, training support, nation building, and kinetic operations. The use of violence is restrictive, and operations are mainly non-kinetic. Military units rarely operate as autonomous entities; rather they will have to work harmoniously in a multinational and interagency environment. In this environment it is very likely that several countries will have to operate with some national restrictions. Therefore, the complexity and scope of small wars put greater demands on military leadership, both at the tactical and the operational level.

3. Analysis

This chapter will analyze the seven leadership attributes that are identified as being crucial for military leaders in a small war environment, based on several case studies and the results of a leadership questionnaire. The respondents to the questionnaire almost unanimously agree (96%) that military leadership has prevented (humanitarian) disasters or violent escalations during small wars (see Appendix E for a detailed analysis of the results from the questionnaire). A significant number (63%) observed that poor leadership compromised the mission ability to prevent a humanitarian disaster or violent escalation. These statistics confirm that leadership at the tactical and operational level plays a crucial role in success during small wars.

The respondents consider all of the nineteen leadership attributes that were listed in the questionnaire as important during both conventional and small wars, which confirms that the fundamentals of good leadership are timeless.¹³ The statistics of the questionnaire also show that the respondents consider seven attributes as being more important than others as they suggest that military leaders need to be more adept in these attributes in order to be successful in a small war environment.¹⁴ One of the respondents, a British officer with experience in a wide variety of small wars, explained that:

Of course, there is plenty of discussion about the Strategic Corporal, and Northern Ireland was a very particular situation, that has few parallels with the likes of Iraq or Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, each commander has to react to the situation he faces, which may be very different from that faced by a colleague just a couple of kilometers away – he has to take daily decisions on actions and activities that may promote stability or lead to a negative response; it is a balancing act, with the use of soft and hard effects in varying degrees – this requires a heightened range of skills than necessarily required in a ‘straightforward’ conventional operation; many of the same qualities are required, but small wars requires some to come to the fore more readily.¹⁵

From the case studies and the results of the survey seven leadership attributes emerged as essential in small wars. These are: adaptability, judgment, sociability, resoluteness &

persuasiveness, courage, empathy, and independence. These seven attributes will be analyzed in this chapter, illustrated by examples from both the case studies and the survey results. Knowledge & experience were identified as supporting skills for military leaders during small wars, and will be analyzed in the final section of this chapter.

3.1 Adaptability

Adaptability is the ability to change to fit fluid circumstances. The degree of adaptability is determined by a leader's creativity and flexibility.¹⁶ Creativity is the ability to generate new methods to solve reoccurring problems or to come up with improvising solutions to immediate problems.¹⁷ Creative leaders have the ability to think outside of the box without losing touch with reality. Flexibility is the ease with which one is able to switch quickly from one type of thought or action to another.

U.S. Army General David Petraeus stressed the importance of leadership in a counterinsurgency environment. In Petraeus' view, "There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders."¹⁸ Leaders that demonstrated initiative, creativity, determination, and courage were key to many of the successes in Iraq. Adaptable leaders, with a high degree of creativity and flexibility, are better suited to deal with the constantly changing environment of a small war.

In small wars there will often be situations where military leaders will encounter unfamiliar challenges that require adjustment of established practices. The Small Wars Manual emphasizes the need for adaptability with the premise that "Small wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity."¹⁹ Individuals who lack creativity and flexibility rely on standard tactics, techniques, and procedures rather than explore and consider new ones that could prove to be more effective. Creative leaders have a talent to combine one or more unrelated techniques and come up with new courses of action. Flexible

leaders do not develop new methods or solutions, yet they are very effective at implementing new methods created by others. Flexibility also allows leaders to effectively deal with the moral and political challenges and ambiguities that are always present during small wars. So, creativity and flexibility are not the same, and in most instances one quality is often present without the other.²⁰

British Army General Mike Jackson is a good example of an adaptive leader. In 1996 he was a division commander in Bosnia (IFOR), and in 1999 he was the commander of NATO forces in Kosovo (KFOR). In his biography he described his relationship with U.S. Army General Wesley Clark who was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. General Clark was a highly educated officer, clever, confident, energetic, and driven. However, he was not able to change his conventional war mind-set to the situation he faced in Bosnia and Kosovo. In Jackson's view, Clark was convinced that the only way to stop the Serbs was an all-out-war.²¹ According to General Jackson, Clark gave a totally inappropriate speech about moving to a total war and the fact that NATO soldiers had to relearn the spirit of the bayonet during a videoconference meeting with senior officers of the multinational force.²² Later, while there was no political support for a ground war, Clark gave a press conference where he advocated a forced entry into Kosovo.

In 1999, just before NATO forces moved into Kosovo, a Russian contingent was about to deploy to Kosovo and occupy Pristina airfield. General Clark perceived the Russian troop movements as a threat and issued orders to General Jackson to deploy early into Kosovo, which was a breach of the newly signed agreement with the Serbs, in order to beat the Russians to Pristina airfield. The Cold War thinking of Clark still had the overhand, and he had drawn an analogy with the race to Berlin in 1945.²³ After political pressure Clark abandoned his plan.

Later on a new confrontation occurred between General Jackson and General Clark. After the Russian forces occupied Pristina airfield, Clark believed that the Russians would reinforce the airfield and use it to send troops into the Serb enclaves.²⁴ He ordered Jackson to block the

runway. General Jackson tried to reason with Clark to prevent confrontation and use a more subtle approach to deal with the Russians. Ultimately, Jackson refused to execute the order and told Clark, “Sir, I’m not going to start World War Three for you.”²⁵ The runway was not blocked, and an unnecessary and potentially dangerous confrontation with the Russians was prevented. Two months after this incident, earlier than expected, General Clark was replaced as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

General Clark clearly lacked adaptability. On several occasions his default mindset was focused on a conventional war mentality. Although he was a successful leader during the Cold War, he failed to adapt to the new small wars environment in the Balkans. General Jackson also grew up in a British Army that was preparing for the Cold War, but he was able to change his mindset and adapt to the new security environment. Jackson focused on preventing confrontation and escalation, promoting peace, and creating stability.²⁶ Many commentators had predicted genocide in Kosovo; however, the NATO intervention was successful, and set Kosovo on a road to a better future.

3.2 Judgment

Judgment is also a key leadership attribute during small wars. Judgment is the use of logic and intuition to quickly assess information and make sound and timely decisions.²⁷ Small wars characteristics complicate the decision-making process. First, the environment is more dispersed, chaotic, and changing than the conventional operating environment. Second, there are more actors that influence that environment such as non-combatants, media, governmental institutions, criminals, and, more important, the local population.

As stated in the Small Wars Manual, “Small wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders

lacking specific instructions.”²⁸ Junior leaders operate in a decentralized environment that requires them to be confident, independent, and capable to operate following the intent of their commander. Senior leaders, both at the tactical and operational level, will often find that they receive conflicting orders. For both the junior and the senior leaders there is another complicating factor that influences their judgment. In highly threatening and dangerous situations, they have to make constant assessments on their priorities. Does the priority lie with their mission, or with the safety of their personnel? This is a moral issue that requires sound judgment.

In his book *The Utility of Force*, General Rupert Smith stressed the importance of judgment. He stated that during small wars the true skill lies in the assessment and the decision as to what action, if any, to take.²⁹ He argues that the priorities tend to be set on the urgency of action rather than setting the highest priority on the issue that has the greatest value in achieving the desired outcome.³⁰

General David Petraeus described the complex and decentralized environment in which junior leaders operate during counterinsurgency operations. They often have to make major decisions, in complex and time-constrained situations that usually have life-or-death as well as strategic consequences.³¹ Petraeus emphasized the importance of quality leaders, and reinforces the fact that military leaders require sound judgment skills during small wars.

In 1994, Canadian General Romeo Dallaire faced several dilemmas as the Force Commander of the UN troops in Rwanda. On April 7 the plane that carried both the Rwandan and Burundian presidents was shot down on approach to Kigali airport, and the situation in Rwanda quickly became violent.³² What followed was a systematic killing of the Tutsis and moderate Hutu government officials. General Dallaire received conflicting instructions from the UN headquarters in New York. Although UNAMIR’s rules of engagement allowed the use of

deadly force to prevent crimes against humanity, he was told that UN forces could only return fire when fired upon.

Following the crash, General Dallaire left his headquarters to have a meeting with the Hutu dominated military. On his way to this meeting he saw that several Rwandan soldiers had detained a few of his Belgian peacekeepers. In the meantime the situation further deteriorated and was completely out of control. Several Rwandan officials had been murdered, UN personnel had been captured, and Kigali was falling into a state of anarchy. Dallaire held on to the hope that he could bring the situation to some kind of resolution, and continued to engage with the Hutu military leaders throughout the day. In the evening he found out that ten Belgian soldiers had been slaughtered.

Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie is very critical of Dallaire's leadership during the crisis in Rwanda. He claims that Dallaire was only experienced in conventional warfare and totally unfamiliar with the ambiguities of UN decision-making.³³ According to MacKenzie, General Dallaire was unable to make a proper judgment call and shift his priority from his futile attempts to save a UN mandate that had been overtaken by irreversible events to saving the captured Belgian peacekeepers.³⁴ The mandate was made even more implausible by the ambiguous direction that Dallaire received from the UN headquarters, which basically ordered him to be a bystander as the genocide was taking place.

A positive case to illustrate the value of sound judgment is the deployment of British forces to Sierra Leone in 2000. Brigadier David Richards was tasked to conduct the evacuation of Commonwealth citizens. Once on the ground, Richards met with officials from the Sierra Leone government and the UN, who were in complete disarray and near collapse because troops of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) were less than twenty miles from Freetown. Richards also met with the leaders of various armed factions roaming the streets of Freetown. After assessing the

situation Brigadier Richards decided to greatly expand his mission to include saving the UNAMSIL mission from collapse.³⁵ He quickly dispatched British officers to provide military advice and resolve to UNAMSIL units and Sierra Leone Army (SLA) units at key points in and around the city. According to Richards the most decisive factor was to persuade UN units to switch from a peacekeeping to a conventional defensive posture.³⁶ He also discouraged the armed factions from joining the fighting by demonstrating the resolve of the UK and UNAMSIL to remain in control.

By the end of May 2000, UNAMSIL, SLA, and British forces drove the RUF forces far away from Freetown and Lungi airport. The tide had turned in favor of the government and the UN. British forces departed Sierra Leone on 15 June, and Operation PALLISER came to an end. With renewed confidence UNAMSIL and SLA soldiers were able to take over positions previously secured by British soldiers and began actively fighting and winning battles with the RUF. Brigadier Richards has come under some criticism for driving the British mission from the scene by his independent actions. Despite the criticism, it is hard to argue with success, and operationally Palliser was stunningly successful.³⁷

3.3 Sociability

The third critical leadership attribute during small wars is sociability. According to Donald Philips, interpersonal relationships and alliances are means that military leaders can use to achieve their mission.³⁸ Relationships and alliances are built on trust, reliability, and credibility, and therefore it takes time to establish them. Sociability is a crucial attribute that will enable military leaders to build and establish relationships and alliances.

Sociable leaders impress and influence others through one-on-one interaction. During small wars, leaders must interact with leaders of other organizations and other nationalities to

obtain their cooperation. They also interact regularly with local citizens who can provide invaluable assistance. It is not about engaging key leaders and actors when a crisis arises, it is about building relationships over time with enough strength and depth, so that they can then support the leader's interests during times of crisis. Phillips and Loy rightly noted that, "The middle of the crisis is the worst time to exchange business cards."³⁹ Without periodic and consistent engagement, these relationships often lack the depth of understanding and strength needed to generate support and collaboration on important issues.

Sociable leaders tend to spend more time visiting those under their command, which enhances their capacity for influencing and monitoring subordinates. A commander who is not in close contact with his personnel will hear little of what they are really concerned with.

Stefan Seiler and Andres Pfister noted that, during small wars, it is crucial for military leaders to understand the requirement for, and to become a valuable and trusted member of military and non-military networks.⁴⁰ Military leaders need to gain access to a network, and subsequently they should become trusted and valued members of that network. Sociability, along with empathy and the ability to interact, is a crucial attribute that is required to build relationships and to gain access to networks.

General David Petraeus concluded his article with observations on counterinsurgency in Iraq with, "A leader's most important task is to set the right tone."⁴¹ According to Petraeus, it is absolutely crucial the military leader makes it clear how he expects his subordinates to operate, and to ensure that they use the right approach. He needs to set the tone with regards to ethical behavior, the use of force, and interaction with local population. In order to do this leaders must be fully engaged and involved with their subordinates. This requires sociability skills that enable military leaders to connect, relate, and communicate effectively with their troops.

From 2003 to 2005, Swedish Brigadier General Jan-Gunnar Isberg served as the deputy force commander and brigade commander during the United Nation Mission Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). He was the only western soldier in his brigade that was further comprised of a Uruguayan and a Bangladeshi battalion. Isberg regularly visited his units and was thereby able to influence and mentor his battalions. Especially the Uruguayan battalion had several internal issues and required additional training.⁴² Later during the mission, as the deputy force commander, Isberg displayed the same sociability within the MONUC headquarters. He left much of the administrative work to his staff and used that time to walk around and talk to people. Thus he was able to gather valuable information about the staff, their duties, and the issues within the headquarters.⁴³ Isberg's staff officers felt appreciated, and Brigadier Isberg knew exactly what was going on among his international staff.

General Mike Jackson also showed excellent sociability skills during his command in Kosovo. He visited all his units during the first days of deployment in Kosovo, and was fully engaged with all key actors. An illustrative example of his capability to build relations is the way General Jackson dealt with the Russian commander, General Viktor Zavarzin. After the tension that followed the Russians occupation of the airfield, Jackson met several times with Zavarzin. He sensed that Zavarzin had no real negotiation power and decided to play it long, without pushing for an immediate solution. He supported the Russians by providing drinking water, and sent a British unit, commanded by his own son (Mark Jackson), to provide protection against Kosovo Liberation Army snipers.⁴⁴ Their relation quickly became more cordial and led to good cooperation. The Russians deployed into sectors with other NATO forces, and turned over responsibility for air traffic control and logistics at the airfield to the British troops. Jackson effectively defused a potential political nightmare by building a solid relationship with General Zavarzin.

Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans, the battalion commander of Dutchbat III in Srebrenica, had very limited social skills. He was an introvert, not very approachable, and withdrawn. He was more a general staff officer than a battalion commander.⁴⁵ His executive officer, Major Franken, was in charge of leading the battalion's daily activities, while Karremans focused on reporting to his commanders.⁴⁶ As a result, Karremans hardly had any visibility within the battalion as its commander. For some it was unclear whether he or his executive officer was in charge of the battalion.⁴⁷ Members of the battalion were united in their judgment that Karremans found it hard to relate to his soldiers.⁴⁸ This contributed to the fact that there was not a lot of trust in Karremans' leadership, and in turn this had a negative effect on the battalion's morale. The lack of trust most likely contributed to the fact that during the hectic moments when the situation escalated in July 1995, there were several incidents in which battalion orders to defend UN positions around Srebrenica were not executed.⁴⁹

Karremans' personal interaction with the local population and key leaders was also very limited. It was mainly the battalion Civil-Military-Affairs section to conduct meetings and negotiations with representatives from the local population, non-governmental organizations, the Bosnian Army (ABiH), and the Bosnian Serbs.⁵⁰ As a result, Karremans was not fully aware of the developing situation, and he was unable to directly influence the key leaders in the area. During the deployment of Dutchbat III the situation in the enclave deteriorated, and tension increased between the Dutch peacekeepers, the local population, the Bosnian Army, and Bosnian Serbs. In retrospect, if Karremans would have built personal relationships with the key leaders in Srebrenica, he might have been able to influence them when the situation escalated in 1995.

3.4 Negotiation Skills - Resoluteness & Persuasiveness

Sociability enables military leaders to build and establish relationships; they should also be resolute and persuasive to be effective during negotiations that are an inherent part of small wars. Military leaders find themselves in a multinational and multicultural environment in which they will deal with coalition forces, indigenous security forces, the local population, non-governmental organizations, civilian key leaders, tribal elders, warlords, and religious leaders. In such a complex environment they conduct daily negotiations that are critical to build for support for their mission. Some of their counterparts will be cooperative, but they will also have to deal with people who are unreliable and provocative. In this dynamic and complex environment of communication, intimidation, and persuasion, both junior and senior leaders should be able to hold their ground. Therefore, military leaders are required to be more adept in the attributes resoluteness and persuasiveness.

General Rupert Smith, while the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia in 1995, was in regular negotiations with several key actors. The negotiations with General Mladic were especially confrontational, because, in Smith's words, Mladic "appeared a confident and arrogant bully".⁵¹ Another British senior officer, General Michael Rose, conducted multiple negotiations with Mladic, who he describes as brutal and manipulative. He suffered rapid changes of mood and used a combination of persuasion, trickery, and intimidation to win arguments.⁵²

Smith described his negotiations with Mladic as mental battles, where he needed all his wit, ability to escalate, and persuasiveness to win these battles of the mind and intentions. Mladic did not see UNPROFOR as a threat and was once overheard referring to Smith as the 'blue lamb'.⁵³ In Smith's view Mladic used the UN forces as potential hostages in order to exercise a form of control over UNPROFOR. Therefore, Smith decided that he needed to appear to Mladic

as being unpredictable and difficult to control.⁵⁴ Being persuasive and resolute allowed Rupert Smith to achieve successes in his negotiations with Mladic.

General Rose describes a situation in which he was leading negotiations for a ceasefire between the Serbs and Bosnians that also required his resoluteness and persuasiveness. At the last minute the Bosnian General Divjak, who had full political and military negotiating powers, did not attend an important meeting. Rose was furious at this attempt to break up the negotiation process and he drove to Divjak. General Rose burst into Divjak's office and told him that he would not be lied to or given the run-around by the Bosnian government. Subsequently, he forced General Divjak into his vehicle and drove to the Bosnian President Izetbegovic, where he persuaded Izetbegovic to support the negotiations.⁵⁵ As a result of General Rose's approach, several hours later that day a crucial agreement between the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnians was signed that was the beginning of the end of the civil war in Bosnia.⁵⁶

Rose describes another situation that illustrate his negotiation skills. He regularly had to deal with the Bosnian Vice-President Ejup Ganic who had no respect for the UN. Rose soon discovered that if he stared long enough at Ganic, he would lose the thread of what he was saying and nervously fumble for words.⁵⁷ In this environment where deceit and treachery had become a way of life, General Rose stood his ground because he was persistent, persuasive, and resolute.⁵⁸

Australian Lieutenant-Colonel Jon Hawkins describes another example of persuasiveness (in combination with sociability) during the deployment of the Australian Defense Forces (ADF) to East Timor in 1999.⁵⁹ Several Australian teams operated embedded within the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL) in order to provide liaison with the Australian headquarters. INTERFET allowed the FALINTIL to remain armed, but they had to stay in their cantonments until peace was restored.

After another incident in the capitol Dili, the FALINTIL leadership was infuriated and wanted to march on Dili, bearing weapons. This would violate the existing agreement and would have further aggravated the security situation. The FALINTIL elements in the cantonment threatened the Australians, and the potential for a major incident was high. An ADF warrant officer with one of the teams was able to influence the FALINTIL leadership by using the relationship that he had built with them (sociability). By being persistent, honest, and objective the warrant officer was able to persuade the FALINTIL leadership, defuse the situation, and prevent escalation.

After the fall of the Srebrenica enclave in July 1995, Lieutenant-Colonel Tom Karremans had to negotiate with General Mladic about the humanitarian situation in the enclave. Karremans was under strict orders of General Rupert Smith to obtain guarantees for the safety of the Bosnian wounded and refugees. Another condition was that Dutchbat would take all its weapons and equipment when it would leave Srebrenica.⁶⁰ During the first meeting Karremans was intimidated by Mladic who used his typical repeated tirades to overawe his opponent.⁶¹ Mladic also ensured that Karremans was filmed where it appeared he was toasting to Mladic's victory.

Mladic accused Karremans for the air attacks on Serb forces and the death of some of his soldiers. Karremans' reply was weak, and he was twisting the truth by stating that he was not responsible for the air attacks.⁶² Mladic established psychological dominance over Karremans, and used that advantage throughout the negotiations. Miroslav Deronjic (the Serb Civil Commissioner for Srebrenica) states that Karremans did not exactly help the humanitarian situation in Srebrenica and the intended withdrawal of Dutchbat forces. He thought that Karremans was afraid to offend Mladic and agreed to everything he said, even if it was against the interests of Dutchbat. Deronjic was under the impression that Karremans was definitely scared of Mladic.⁶³

There is no doubt that Mladic was manipulative and a master of intimidation. This was his usual approach to negotiations with UNPROFOR personnel and leaders. During the negotiations, Karremans seemed to be a defeated man, who avoided making eye contact with Mladic.⁶⁴ He lacked the strength, resoluteness, and persuasiveness to counter Mladic's intimidations, and thereby influence the negotiations. This does not imply that more successful negotiations by Karremans would have prevented the humanitarian disaster that followed. However, it does reinforce that resoluteness and persuasiveness are crucial attributes for military leaders in order to successfully negotiate during small wars.

3.5 Courage

Just as negotiation skills, courage is a key attribute for military leaders during small wars. Courage is the strength and ability to face something that one would normally avoid or is frightening. There is a clear distinction between moral and physical courage. Physical courage is the form of courage that most people will associate with the term courage, and it can be described as bravery, heroism, and valor in battle.⁶⁵ In *Moral courage*, Rushworth Kidder defines moral courage as the quality of mind and spirit that enables one to face up to ethical challenges firmly and confidently, without flinching or retreating.⁶⁶ It is the courage to be ethical and take action in accords with the core values of honesty, fairness, respect, responsibility, and compassion.⁶⁷

General Michael Rose stressed that, "In peacekeeping, as in war, risks have to be taken and it probably requires more courage for peacekeepers to venture into hostile territory armed only with a conviction that they are morally right, than it does for armed soldiers to do the same."⁶⁸ Risk-taking is the process of exposing oneself to danger, unpleasantness, or undesirable circumstances.⁶⁹ It means someone is not afraid to take chances and does not back down from an ethical challenge. In any situation, there is an inherent risk in taking the first step forward.

However, leaders routinely take that first step and take action. They understand that in order to make progress they need to take risks and confront issues.

In small wars military forces operate amongst the people, and they often have significant restrictions on the use of force. This means that military leaders usually face a moral dilemma in deciding how much risk they are willing to assume in order to protect and support civilians. Sarah Sewall claims that this provides an even greater dilemma during counterinsurgency operations because the primacy of civilian protection is at odds with military service values that stress loyalty to fellow soldiers and Marines.⁷⁰ The challenge for military leaders is to strike a balance between competing personal values, service values, force protection and mission accomplishment.

The respondents' opinions regarding the importance of courage during small wars differs from the analysis of the case studies. The case studies clearly indicate that physical and moral courage are crucial attributes for military leaders in a small war environment. The respondents to the questionnaire associate courage more with conventional war, probably because most people have a dominant mental picture of physical courage during actual combat as is shown in Appendix E, page E-8.

During certain types of small wars such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief there is less risk, and probably less need for physical courage. However, during other types of small wars (for example stability operations and peace support operations) military leaders will regularly find themselves in positions where they need to show both moral and physical courage. Physical courage is needed due to the asymmetric threat and during kinetic engagements. There is an added level of complexity due to the ethical dilemma in deciding how much risk the military leader is willing to accept to his own forces in order to protect civilians or to achieve the mission. It requires that leaders have moral courage to deal with the ethical dilemmas of small wars. One

of the respondents was very clear about the absolute requirement for moral courage during small wars:

Coupled with judgment is moral courage. In stability operations, moral courage is also essential. If an officer does not have the courage to stand-up for that which is right, because it is right, he will fail in his duties as an officer and risk mission failure. Because stability operations, in some cases, are long, drawn out, and violent, someone without the moral courage to act may quickly find himself doing what he previously thought was unimaginable. Thus, there is premium on officers who possess both superior judgment and moral courage – I do not think you can separate the two in stability operations.⁷¹

This discord between the analysis of the case studies and the outcome of the questionnaire normally would require a follow up questionnaire to clarify the difference. However, a second questionnaire is not possible within the scope of this study. For the purpose of this study it is therefore assumed that the respondents associated courage more with conventional war because most people have a dominant mental picture of physical courage during actual combat.

While in Bosnia, Rupert Smith had to deal with nations that would not allow their troops to conduct certain operations due to the risk involved. This reluctance to risk forces was caused by a lack of political commitment. Smith states: “As the lady said, you can’t be a little bit pregnant, and you can’t be a little bit interventionist either. If you stand in the middle of someone else’s fight you must expect to be pushed around; and if you do intervene, decide if you are fighting one or all of the sides and get on with it – and be prepared to risk forces allocated to achieve the object.”⁷² At the strategic level, the political will and courage to risk the forces to achieve the objective of the mission is crucial.

General Michael Rose describes another situation that involves courage. In 1993 the Bosnian Serbs attacked Srebrenica, and after the Muslim defenses had collapsed the way lay open for Serb tanks. General Morillon and his liaison officer, Captain Nick Costello, placed themselves on the road between the firing lines and waited for General Mladic to arrive. They

negotiated until Mladic agreed to cease the attack in return for the creation of a demilitarized enclave.⁷³

General Rose had to make high-risk decisions daily in order to keep the humanitarian aid flowing and the peace process progressing. On one occasion the Serbs threatened to destroy a UN convoy in the vicinity of Tuzla. They suspected that the convoy was used to resupply the Bosnian Army. Major-General Milovanovic, General Mladic' chief of staff, was warned that NATO air support would be used to protect the convoy and an attack would be conducted against all Serb gun positions in the area. Milovanovic said that the Serbs were not afraid of NATO air power and that he would use his artillery if the convoy did not turn around.⁷⁴ General Rose decided not to stop the convoy, because the UN mission would otherwise suffer a serious loss of credibility. The quick arrival of NATO aircraft allowed the convoy to complete its task without incident, although the Serbs fired several artillery rounds in the vicinity to save face. In taking this decision, General Rose took a serious, but necessary, risk with the lives of the people in the convoy. If he had succumbed to the provocation and intimidation of the Serbs it would have been extremely difficult to recover and maintain freedom of movement in order to continue the peace process.

Lack of moral courage was an issue when the situation in Srebrenica escalated in 1995. The deteriorating situation was influenced by many internal and external factors, and as a result it was difficult for Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans to assess the situation and make the right decisions. One of the factors that played a crucial role was the reluctance to use force by Dutchbat III.⁷⁵ This was mainly caused by the strong prejudice that Dutchbat was in no position to defend Srebrenica, and it was also influenced by the deteriorating relationship between Dutchbat and the Bosnians.⁷⁶ Karremans' dilemma was to balance the safety of the Bosnian population with that of his own soldiers. The latter got priority and Karremans showed a lack of moral courage to accept risk and do the right thing.⁷⁷

The situation in Srebrenica had started to deteriorate prior to Dutchbat III's deployment because the Serbs imposed many restrictions on freedom of movement to and from the enclave. In May 1995 the Serbs held several hundred UN soldiers hostage in two other safe areas Gorazde and Zepa, and as a result the Serb threat to Srebrenica further increased. Karremans told the Serbs that he would respond with force to any Serb attempt to cross the enclave border.⁷⁸ Several days later (June 3) there was a Serb attack on a Dutch observation post, but there was no resistance from the Dutch soldiers.

While the threat increased, Karremans never developed contingency plans to defend the enclave. Rehearsing these contingencies could have sent out a strong signal to the Serbs, and could possibly have deterred Serb aggression. As a result, the commanders of the different observation posts around Srebrenica had no plan to defend their position, and they did not receive Karremans' commanders intent. This in turn led to a risk-averse mindset among the battalion junior leaders. Although the lack of risk-taking can be justified from the prejudice that Dutchbat would not be able to defend the enclave, there are military procedures to mitigate risk. These measures were not taken by Karremans, and most likely contributed to the fact that the Serbs encountered no resistance when they attacked Srebrenica.

The experience of one of the respondents to the questionnaire is used as the final example to illustrate the importance of courage and risk-taking. He was a battalion commander during stability operations in Iraq in 2004, and he was invited by the local imam to join him in the celebration of a religious Shi'a holiday.⁷⁹ Just before departure to the mosque his translator informed him about the fact that in previous years the Shi'a had murdered Sunni's and Christians during and after that same celebration. What to do? Being present during the celebration was an important step in building relationships with the local key leaders, and therefore crucial to progress of the mission. The battalion commander took limited measures to mitigate the risk, and

attended the celebration. This example clearly indicates that small wars also require a form of courage and ability to take risk. It differs from the type of courage and risk that is associated with combat during conventional operations.

3.6 Empathy

The next leadership attribute that will be analyzed is empathy. Empathy enables leaders to appreciate the thoughts, feelings, and needs of others. Empathy means thoughtfully considering the subordinate's feeling, along with other factors, during the process of making intelligent and sound decisions.⁸⁰ Leaders need to be sincere and show genuine compassion and true concern for others. Empathy is also important as military leaders will interact with other cultures, and cross-culture dialogue can easily lead to misunderstandings. Daniel Goleman argues that people with empathy are attuned to subtleties in non-verbal communication, and tend to have a better awareness of the existence and importance of cultural, social, and ethical differences.⁸¹

Besides having good sociable skills, General Mike Jackson also showed empathy when he dealt with the Russian General Victor Zavarzin in Kosovo. He understood that Zavarzin was in an isolated situation with no real power since he had to refer all issues back to Moscow. Jackson also had a good understanding of the Russian culture and regularly offered Zavarzin a sip from his hip flask of whisky. He also understood the sentimental nature of the Russians, and therefore ensured the Russian General that Jackson's own son would command the British unit that would provide force protection at the airfield.

As described earlier, General Petraeus showed sound judgment as a division commander in Iraq and recognized the insurgency he had to counter. He also had the adaptability to come up with new solutions that fit the situation in Mosul.⁸² In addition, he proved that he was an empathetic leader insisting that his soldiers respected local customs, and focused on winning the

hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.⁸³ He improved conditions in the prisons, and invited Iraqi leaders to observe these improvements. Cordon and sweep operations were replaced by cordon and knock searches, preventing unnecessarily insulting Iraqi dignity. Petraeus showed that he was sensitive to Iraqi culture and adapted accordingly.

3.7 Independence

Independence is the final leadership attribute that will be analyzed. Independence can be described as the ability to operate without direct supervision, guidance, and support from others. The small war environment is highly decentralized, and independence is therefore an essential attribute. Junior and senior leaders are responsible for areas of operation that are normally larger than those during conventional war, and in addition they have to deal with the far more complex human terrain. In order to make good assessments and sound decisions, they need a higher degree of independence and autonomy during small wars compared to conventional war.

A French officer who participated in the questionnaire provides an excellent example of the complex contemporary operating environment when he was deployed as a platoon commander in the Ivory Coast in May 2003.⁸⁴ He was in charge of an area almost the size of Luxembourg. His company commander was a two-hour drive away, and the closest other French unit was a one-hour drive away from his combat outpost. Often he had no radio contact with his higher headquarters during patrols, and as a result he regularly had to make decisions that would normally be above the level of a platoon commander. He represented the French government in the area of operations, and had to deal with local tribal and militia leaders. In addition, the ethnicity mix and tribal issues were peculiar to that area, and therefore he had to quickly develop his own situational awareness and understanding.

Large areas of operation, gaps between the units, many stakeholders, and complex human terrain are typical for small wars. The French respondent states that military leaders are required to quickly understand the situation, identify the issues they have to address, and be able to adapt to the situation. Military leaders need to have a clear intent from their commander to allow them to operate independently in a highly decentralized environment. They also need to issue their own commander's intent to their subordinates because in some situations the intent can be the only reference to support junior leaders' decision-making. Under these circumstances it is crucial that a military leader is self-reliant and independent. He has no direct supervision from his superiors, and frequently will have to make decisions without additional guidance.

The case study of the Australian liaison team leader in East Timor also confirms that military leaders require a significant degree of independence and self-reliance.⁸⁵ The Australian liaison teams were embedded with the FALINT forces, and when the situation escalated in 1999 they had to act immediately without consulting their headquarters. This emphasizes the necessity that military leaders need to be more adept in the attribute independence during small wars.

3.8 Supporting skills - Knowledge & Experience

In retrospect, 'Knowledge & Experience' is not an attribute but rather a skill, and perhaps should not have been included in the questionnaire. Military leaders can acquire knowledge in preparation for future operations, and via education and training they can prepare themselves and their subordinates for both small and conventional wars. Experience is something that every military professional will acquire throughout his career; however, the relevance of that experience depends on timing and opportunity. However, the statistics of this attribute indicate that the majority of the respondents consider extensive knowledge & experience a crucial element for leaders in small wars (see Appendix E).

The case studies confirm the premise that knowledge & experience are important skills for military leaders. Throughout his whole career the Canadian general Roméo Dallaire had prepared for conventional war, and had no experience with peace support operations or any knowledge about the African continent when he was appointed the force commander of UNAMIR.⁸⁶ In contrast, General David Petraeus had experience with peace support operations prior to his deployment to Iraq.⁸⁷ He also had extensive knowledge about counterinsurgency; in 1987 he earned a doctorate in international relations at Princeton writing his dissertation about the American military and lessons of Vietnam.⁸⁸ Petraeus used his knowledge & experience when he had to conduct a counterinsurgency operation in 2003 in Iraq and was one of the few successful and effective commanders at that time.⁸⁹

Several of the respondents remarked that knowledge is crucial to create situational understanding during small wars. In depth knowledge about the history, culture, and religion of the local population will facilitate this process. Having a basic knowledge of the local language will facilitate the interaction and communication with translators and key leaders.

Experience also provides the military leader with an advantage. Significant leadership experience will give the leader the respect from his subordinates, and it also gives him insight to his weaknesses and strengths. Experience with small wars will increase the likelihood that he has already developed his leadership skills, and is more likely to be more adept in the crucial attributes for small wars. In short, although knowledge & experience are not actual leadership attributes, these skills will influence the effectiveness and success of a military leader. Knowledge & experience can therefore be considered as supporting skills to successful leadership in a small war environment.

3.9 Summary

From the case studies and leadership questionnaire, seven leadership attributes emerged as being crucial for military leaders during small wars; adaptability, judgment, persuasiveness & resoluteness, sociability, courage, empathy, and independence. Military leaders who are more adept in these attributes are more likely to be successful during small wars. Not all leaders will rate high in all seven of the attributes, but it is safe to conclude that the level of their performance is related to the extent of their adeptness in these attributes. Knowledge & experience are important supporting skills for military leaders in a small war environment.

4. Conclusions

Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith wrote in his introduction to Mao Tse-Tung's *Guerrilla Warfare* that imaginative, intelligent, and bold leadership is absolutely essential for anti-guerrilla operations.⁹⁰ He states that, "Officers and noncommissioned officers who are more than competent under normal conditions will frequently be hopelessly ineffective when confronted with the dynamic and totally different situations characteristics of guerrilla warfare." Griffith made this observation in 1961, but it is still valid today and has an even broader applicability to all types of small wars.

This paper has shown that small wars are significantly more complex than conventional wars. This puts greater demand on military leadership, both at the tactical and the operational level. The diversity of tasks and threats, primacy of politics, and the decentralized nature of small wars have implications for both junior and senior leaders.

The analysis of different case studies and the results of the questionnaire provide evidence that the fundamental leadership attributes are timeless and common for both conventional and small wars. Since the characteristics of small wars differ substantially from conventional warfare, in order to be successful, military leaders require to be more adept in certain attributes in a small war environment.

The case studies and questionnaire confirm that military leadership plays a crucial role, at both the tactical and operational level, in the prevention of (humanitarian) disasters and the escalation of violence during small wars. Seven leadership attributes have been identified that are crucial during small wars. These are adaptability, judgment, persuasiveness & resoluteness, sociability, courage, empathy, and independence. Military leaders who are more adept in these attributes are more likely to be successful during small wars. Not all leaders will rate high in all

seven attributes, but the extent of their adeptness in these attributes will determine their ability to perform successfully. These military leaders can quickly adapt, make the right assessments, easily establish relationships with other key actors, effectively negotiate, deal with risk and ethical challenges, handle cultural and social issues, and can operate in a decentralized environment. They are therefore more capable to deal with the constantly changing characteristics of the small wars operating environment.

In addition to the seven crucial leadership attributes, this paper also shows that knowledge & experience have a strong influence on the effectiveness and success of military leaders during small wars. A solid knowledge of history, culture, religion, and language of the population they are interacting with is important to create situational understanding of the complex environment of a war amongst the people and to facilitate judgment. Previous leadership experience will create better leaders, and experience in small wars will enhance a leader's ability to adapt to another small war environment.

Looking back at Srebrenica in 1994 it is clear that Lieutenant Colonel Karremans lacked proficiency in certain leadership attributes that are essential for small wars. Although structural factors played an important role in Srebrenica, different leadership could have made a difference. A more capable leader could have made a correct assessment of the increasing Serbian threat, and would have taken appropriate action to mitigate the risks. More empathy could have ensured better awareness of the ethical situation that might have prevented the deteriorating relationship between the Bosnian population and Dutch peacekeepers. A leader with better social skills would have established relationships with the key leaders in the area that could have been used when the situation escalated. Better judgment and courage could have prevented the development of a risk-averse mindset within the battalion that led to the unopposed attack on Srebrenica. Although

there is no doubt that only Mladic and the Bosnian Serbs are responsible for the genocide, it can also be concluded that Karremans was not fit for command.

Failures like the performance of Lieutenant Colonel Karremans in Srebrenica underscore the importance of capable leadership. All military organizations have their own institutions for the education and training of their officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted. A large portion of the basic training still focuses on conventional war because that is still one of the core tasks for the military. However, in order to better prepare junior and senior leaders for the challenges of small wars it is crucial to put sufficient emphasis on the development of the seven leadership attributes that are crucial for these type of operations.

Most of the crucial leadership attributes can be improved. It is important that commanders set the right command climate that will inspire and motivate people to learn and develop. Subordinates should be allowed to make mistakes during training, because that will encourage creativity and risk-taking. Most of the critical attributes can also be enhanced through education and training, under the condition that commanders establish and enforce a systematic approach to feedback and evaluation. Junior and senior leaders play a crucial role within this system by providing guidance and coaching for their subordinates.

By studying the history and lessons identified from small wars, leaders can reflect on their own shortfalls and strive to improve in those areas. Professional discussion about the theory and history of small wars will further develop Marines and soldiers and prepare them for these challenging operations. It is essential that leaders at all levels also resist the urge to rely too much on doctrine and detailed Standard Operating Procedures. When General Mattis was commander of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command he once stated “doctrine is the refuge of the unimaginative.”⁹¹ Doctrine that goes beyond the general principles tends to discourage leaders from taking the initiative and exercise creativity.

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Appendix A Leadership Theories

There are many ways to define leadership, and leadership-theorist Ralph Stogdill once pointed out that there are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are people who have tried to define it.⁹² However, there are several reoccurring elements in most definitions: influence, a group, and a common task or goal. In their book *The architecture of leadership*, Phillips and Loy provide a clear definition: “Leadership is leaders acting –as well as caring, inspiring, and persuading others to act – for certain shared goals that represent the values – the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations – of themselves and the people they represent. And the genius of leadership lies in the manner in which leaders care about, visualize, and act on their own and their followers’ values and motivations.”⁹³

Classical perspectives

To illustrate that some tenets of leadership are timeless and do not change, Christopher Kolenda has analyzed the concepts of leadership as articulated by Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero.⁹⁴ He argues that, while technology and organizations have changed, the human dimension of leadership has remained constant. According to the Greek philosophers, leadership is the art of inspiring and it requires a thorough understanding of human nature. Kolenda concludes that in pursuit of excellence leaders require both character and competence. Character, composed of wisdom, courage, justice, and moderation, has a sort of magnetic effect, and people are naturally drawn to leaders with character. Competence is required to successfully lead followers; the combination of knowledge, intellect, and experience allows leaders to quickly assess information, decide, and act, also in a chaotic and uncertain environment. The developed mind is able to part the shadows of chaos, disorder, and confusion to create a vision and pursue it with conviction.

Carl von Clausewitz provides a similar description of the fundamental tenets of military leadership with his concept of Military Genius. According to Clausewitz the truly great commander has superior intellect and strength of character.⁹⁵ Knowledge and intellect will give the military leader the ability to see things simply and act decisively. A military leader has a strong character when he has determination, energy, stability, calmness, and physical and moral courage. These attributes are timeless and apply to all types of military operations.

Trait approach

There are many different approaches or frameworks to analyze leadership. The trait approach stands out among the others because it focuses exclusively on the leader and not on the followers.⁹⁶ Stogdill conducted research on traits between 1904 and 1947, followed by another study between 1948 and 1970. Besides identifying several traits that are crucial for a leader he also concluded that the traits of a leader must be relevant to the situation in which the leader is operating. According to Stogdill “leaders in one situation may not necessarily be leaders in another situation.”⁹⁷ In other words, the situation influences the required leadership. When this principle is applied to military leadership, it implies that the required leadership attributes for conventional warfare are likely to differ from the required attributes for small wars.

Throughout the 21st century there were several studies of leadership traits and attributes.⁹⁸ These researches identified traits and attributes, but there were differences between the outcomes. Some traits appeared in several of the studies, and other only in one or two studies. The five traits that are reoccurring during the majority of these studies are intelligence, self-confidence, determination, integrity, and sociability.⁹⁹

Architecture of leadership

Phillips and Loy provide a pragmatic approach to frame leadership called the architecture of leadership.¹⁰⁰ Their premise is that leadership is more of an art than science. There is no set of

rules to follow, only guidelines, concepts, perceptions, and ideas. They use the analogy of a well designed and solidly constructed building to illustrate that leadership has to be crafted from the ground up. If the foundation has cracks in it, the entire structure might collapse. If the framework isn't strong, the structure may collapse. If the roof leaks, everything inside will get soggy and mildewed.




Figure 1: The architecture of leadership.

Figure 1 shows that the foundation for leadership is based on character and values. Drive and empathy build the floor, and innate traits and several acquired skills make up the framework. According to Phillips and Loy, great leaders possess one or more of eight traits that they are either born with, or acquire at a very early age.¹⁰¹ The best leaders possess all or most of the fourteen skills that help them to become effective at what they do. Unlike the innate traits, these

skills can be learned and will therefore depend on the experience and maturity of the leader. The ceiling of the structure is opportunity, further defined as the right set of circumstances coming together to make it possible to rise to the occasion and lead. The roof is performance, the process of carrying out any action or task in order to achieve success. Without performance, leadership fails.

Marine Corps leadership traits and principles

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) and Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (RNLMC) use the same leadership traits and principles to educate and train new leaders.¹⁰² The fourteen traits are integrity, justice, enthusiasm, bearing, endurance, unselfishness, loyalty, judgment, tact, initiative, dependability, decisiveness, courage, and knowledge. In addition, the RNLMC uses the traits flexibility, credibility, and determination.

The USMC leadership principles provide a simple and no-nonsense approach for military leadership. These have been defined a long time ago and are still relevant today. Colonel Wesley L. Fox (USMC Retired) states in his book on leadership: “To fall short in exercising anyone of them [leadership principles] is to fall short in an important element of the principles required for leadership.”¹⁰³

- Be technically and tactically proficient.
- Know yourself and seek self-improvement.
- Know your marines and look out for their welfare.
- Keep your marines informed.
- Set the example.
- Ensure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished.
- Train your marines as a team.
- Make sound and timely decisions.
- Develop a sense of responsibility among your subordinates.
- Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities.
- Seek responsibility, and take responsibility for your actions.

Appendix B Overview Case Studies

For this thesis several cases were studied in order to identify leadership attributes that are important during small wars. This Appendix shows the overview of the case studies and leaders that were used.

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was a UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995.¹⁰⁴ The mandate for UNPROFOR was to keep the population alive while the war ended, and to provide humanitarian aid. The case studies will focus on several military leaders that served in Bosnia, such as General Sir Mike Jackson (UK), General Rupert Smith (UK), General Sir Michael Rose (UK), Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans (Netherlands), General Wes Clark (US), and General Lewis MacKenzie (Canada).

Another peacekeeping operation that provides leadership insights for this study is the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).¹⁰⁵ Lieutenant-general Romeo Dallaire (Canada) was the force commander and was unable to prevent the humanitarian disaster that occurred in 1994. The UNAMIR mandate included ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitoring the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitoring the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; assisting with mine-clearance; and assisting in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.

Brigadier General Jan-Gunnar Isberg (Sweden) served as the deputy force commander and brigade commander for the United Nation Mission Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the period 2003-2005.¹⁰⁶ Since 2000 MONUC was a peace enforcing operation under chapter VII of the UN charter. The mandate authorized MONUC to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions, to protect UN personnel,

facilities, installations, and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

In October 1999 the UN established the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).¹⁰⁷ The main objective of UNAMSIL was to assist with the disarmament process and enforce the terms established in the Lome Peace Agreement. In May 2000, the situation on the ground had deteriorated to such an extent that British forces were deployed to evacuate foreign nationals and establish order (Operation Palliser). The British forces, under the command of Brigadier David Richards, stabilized the situation, and were the catalyst for a ceasefire that helped to end the war.

The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) had a leading role in the multinational peacekeeping taskforce International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) that deployed to East Timor in 1999.¹⁰⁸ INTERFET was mandated by the UN to address the humanitarian and security crisis that occurred in response to a referendum for independence from Indonesia. Pro-Indonesia militias, supported by the Indonesian government, conducted a massive campaign of looting, provocation, and violence against the East Timorese people. To support the process towards independence, Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL) remained in their cantonments, and had to resist the urge to join the fight. INTERFET deployed on 20 September 1999 to counter the activities of the armed militias and attempt to restore peace.

During the last decade most western militaries have been involved in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States had and has a leading role during these small wars, and the performance of General Ricardo Sanchez and General David Petraeus provides useful insights for this thesis.

Appendix C

Questionnaire Military Leadership

Topic: Military leadership during small wars.

Research Question: What leadership attributes and traits does a military commander require in order to prevent escalation or (humanitarian) disaster during small wars?

Small wars are contemporary operations where military units rarely operate as an autonomous service, but will have to work harmoniously in a multinational and interagency environment. Examples are humanitarian assistance/intervention, peace support operations, counterinsurgency, enforcing exclusion zones, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, etc. Over the past twenty years there have been unsuccessful and successful small wars, and in several cases the military leadership played a crucial role in the outcome. Other structural factors (political influence, ROE's, UNSC, etc.) also play an important role in the outcome of small wars, but for this thesis I will focus on the successes and failures that the 'on-scene' tactical/operational commander can influence. Successful military leaders were able to switch from conventional warfare to the new, complex security environment. Others were less effective, and in some cases this led to a (humanitarian) disaster or catastrophic escalation of the situation. By analyzing unsuccessful and successful leadership from the recent past, and by applying accepted leadership theories I want to identify the leadership attributes and traits that are crucial for small wars.

The basis for my research will be based on relevant literature and articles. Since the available literature is mainly focused on operations in the late 90's and early 21st century, I want to support my thesis with observations from military leaders that recently conducted small wars.

I would like to include your observations and opinion on this topic because of your experience with small wars. I fully appreciate that your time is valuable and limited, and therefore I kept this questionnaire as short as possible. Below are four statements and a list of leadership attributes/traits where you only have to check the box that indicates to what extend you agree or disagree with that statement. I have created an option at the end of the questionnaire in case you want to elaborate on my thesis in general, or a specific question.

1. Based on your personal experience there were situation(s) where military leadership at the tactical/operational level prevented a (humanitarian) disaster or escalation of the situation.

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree

2. Based on your personal experience there were situation(s) where military leadership at the tactical/operational level failed to prevent (humanitarian) disaster or escalation of the situation.

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree

3. Leadership attributes and qualities that are required for small wars differ from the requirements for conventional operations.

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree

4. Did you experience leadership challenges during small wars?

Yes	No	Example

5. The table below lists leadership attributes and traits. Please rate how important you deem these attributes/traits for both conventional and small wars. Please, feel free to add other attributes/traits if you think they are relevant to this topic.

Attribute / trait	Type Conflict	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
Empathy	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Initiative	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Independence	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Judgment	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Intelligence	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Courage (Moral & physical)	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Adaptability	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Persuasiveness	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Determination / Perseverance	Conventional					
	Small wars					

Self-confidence	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Knowledge & experience	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Risk taking	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Respect	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Ethics	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Commitment	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Integrity	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Sociability	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Personality / Charisma	Conventional					
	Small wars					
Decisiveness	Conventional					
	Small wars					
	Conventional					
	Small wars					
	Conventional					
	Small wars					

Additional comments:

Type comments

Can you provide the details below in order to provide more depth to the readers of my thesis?

Mission name	Period	Position held

If you have any questions or remarks, please contact me at ivomoerman@live.nl and/or moermanfamily@verizon.net. You can also call me on my cell phone: (+1) 571-405-1057. Both email addresses can also be used to return the questionnaire. If you are able to provide input for my thesis by submitting the questionnaire, can you return the form no later than **14 January 2013**?


I really appreciate your effort to provide input for my thesis and I want to thank you for your time. Please let me know if I can use your name in my paper. Also, let me know if you are interested in a copy of my paper; if so, I will ensure you receive one in May 2013.

Sincerely,


Ivo D.L. Moerman
Major, Royal Netherlands Marine
Corps

Appendix D Results leadership questionnaire


1. Based on your personal experience there were situation(s) where military leadership at the tactical/operational level prevented a (humanitarian) disaster or escalation of the situation.




2. Based on your personal experience there were situation(s) where military leadership at the tactical/operational level failed to prevent (humanitarian) disaster or escalation of the situation.




3. Leadership attributes and qualities that are required for small wars differ from the requirements for conventional operations.




Empathy:




Initiative:




Independence:




Judgment:




Intelligence:




Courage:




Adaptability:




Persuasiveness:




Perseverance:




Self-confidence:




Knowledge & experience:




Risk-taking:




Respect:




Ethics:




Commitment:




Integrity:




Sociability:



Personality & Charisma:



Decisiveness:



Appendix E Analysis Leadership Questionnaire

The literature on small wars that was used for the case studies mainly focuses on operations in the 1990's and early 21st century. In order to include recent small wars in this study, a questionnaire was sent to military leaders with recent experience during these types of operations. Twenty-seven questionnaires were received back, and the ranks of the respondents varied from major to lieutenant general. The operations that the respondents participated in are shown in the table below.

Name	Acronym	Land/region	Type ¹⁰⁹
United Nations Transitional Authority Cambodia	UNTAC	Cambodia	PKO
United Nations Mission Ethiopia and Eritrea	UNMEE	Ethiopia & Eritrea	PKO
United Nations Protection Force	UNPROFOR	Bosnia	PKO
Implementation Force	IFOR	Bosnia	PKO
Stabilization Force	SFOR	Bosnia	PKO
Kosovo Force	KFOR	Kosovo	PKO
Operation Provide Comfort		Northern Turkey	HA
Operation Iraqi Freedom	OIF	Iraq	COIN
Stabilization Force Iraq	SFIR	Iraq	COIN
Operation Telic		Iraq	COIN
Operation Enduring Freedom	OEF	Afghanistan	COIN
International Security Assistance Force	ISAF	Afghanistan	COIN
Operation Herrick		Afghanistan	COIN
United Nations Angola Verification Mission	UNAVEM	Angola	PKO
Operation banner		Northern Ireland	COIN
Operation Palliser		Sierra Leone	PKO
UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo	MONUC	Congo	PKO
UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC	MONUSCO		
Operation Unicorn		Ivory Coast	PKO
Combined Task Force 150	CTF-150	Horn of Africa	MSO
European Union Force	EUFOR	Chad	PKO

Table 1: Operational experience respondents questionnaire.

The respondents were predominantly from western nations, including the United States, the Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Spain. Billets that the respondents held vary from platoon and company commander to battalion commander, staff officer, commander of a training team, task force commander, division commander, and Military Assistant to the United Nations Secretary General.

In order to maximize the number of respondents the questionnaire mainly consisted of multiple-choice questions. At the end of the questionnaire each respondent had the opportunity to provide additional information and examples. The results of the questionnaire were entered into a database in order to facilitate analysis, and Appendix D shows the data in charts.

Leadership roles

The first three questions of the survey focus on the role and influence of leadership at the tactical and operational level. The results of the questions regarding leadership success and failure provide a clear insight in the role of military leadership. The respondents almost unanimously agree (96%) that leadership has prevented (humanitarian) disaster or escalation of the situation (see chart in figure 1).




Figure 1: Leadership success.

Less of the respondents (63%), but still a majority, also observed leadership failure to prevent disaster or escalation (see chart in figure 2). The outcome of these two questions reinforces the premise that leadership at the tactical and operational level plays a crucial role in the success of the operation.




Figure 2: Leadership failure.

In retrospect, the wording of the third question was poor. It asked for the difference in leadership requirements between small wars and conventional war, where it should have asked if military leaders are required to be more adept in certain leadership attributes for small wars. As a result only 35% of the respondents agree that small wars require different leadership attributes compared to conventional war. However, this outcome does confirm the premise that most of the leadership fundamentals are timeless, and common for both conventional and small wars. Furthermore, the statistics of the second part of the questionnaire clearly indicate that the respondents consider it important that military leaders are more adept in certain leadership attributes in order to be successful during small wars.

Some respondents remarked that there is no need for two types of leaders; military leaders need to be able to operate in both types of war, mainly because some (kinetic) elements of conventional war can also apply during small wars. Several respondents made remarks to clarify their position on the difference in leadership requirements. The majority of these remarks related to the fact that small wars are more complex, and therefore military leaders need a higher proficiency in some of the attributes.¹¹⁰




Figure 3: Leadership attribute difference between contemporary and conventional operations.

A British respondent, with experience in a wide variety of small wars, explains his point of view on this issue.

Of course, there is plenty of discussion about the strategic Corporal, and Northern Ireland was a very particular situation, that has few parallels with the likes of Iraq or Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, each commander has to react to the situation he faces, which may be very different from that faced by a colleague just a couple of kilometers away – he has to take daily decisions on actions and activities that may promote stability or lead to a negative response; it is a balancing act, with the use of soft and hard effects in varying degrees – this requires a heightened range of skills than necessarily required in a ‘straightforward’ conventional operation; many of the same qualities are required, but stability operations requires some to come to the fore more readily.¹¹¹

A General of the United States Marine Corps who returned the questionnaire also reinforced the premise that military leaders require to be more adept in some of the leadership attributes.

There are many who say that if you can do conventional operations, you can do stability operations, so there is no need to specifically train and prepare for them. I could not disagree more. Everyone has to be prepared to specifically deal with the challenges of stability operations – when no one is, especially leaders, you have a significant risk of failure. We paid a great deal of attention to this with my battalion prior to returning to Fallujah and it paid off in a big way. We turned around a near disastrous situation in 2007 - the battalion previous to us lost twenty-two killed-in-action and many wounded in their seven months and many were worrying about “losing” Fallujah again. We had three killed-in-action and twenty-five wounded-in-action in the first five weeks, then got it settled down and had only two lightly wounded for the rest of the deployment. The battalion after us spent their time organizing bike races and soccer matches. I saw many other units that “did not get it” with regard to stability operations and the results were always bad – some units were a disaster.¹¹²

Based on the overall outcome of these three questions it is valid to conclude that military leadership plays a crucial role both at the tactical and operational level of small wars. Successful leadership will not always decide the overall success of the operation (due to the influence of other structural factors), but is crucial in preventing disaster or escalation of the situation. The statistical evidence of the questionnaire also supports the premise that military leaders require to be more adept in certain leadership attributes during small wars.

Leadership attributes

The second part of the questionnaire listed nineteen attributes, and the respondents were asked to rate, on a scale from 1 to 5, the importance of these attributes for both conventional and small wars. After analysis of the results the attributes can be roughly divided into three categories: (1) attributes that are more important during conventional war, (2) attributes that are equally important during both types of operations, and (3) attributes that are more important during small wars. This leads to the overview in the table below.

(1) Conventional War	(2) Equally important	(3) Small wars
Courage Risk-taking	Initiative Intelligence Perseverance Self-confidence Ethics Commitment Integrity Personality & Charisma Decisiveness Respect	Adaptability Judgment Sociability Persuasiveness Empathy Independence (Knowledge & Experience) ¹¹³

Table 2: Importance of leadership attributes per type of conflict.

The statistics of this part of the questionnaire provide the evidence that military leaders need to have certain fundamental leadership attributes that are equally important during both conventional war and small wars. For the purpose of this study, these attributes will not be further analyzed. The statistics also indicate that military leaders are required to be more adept in the attributes adaptability, judgment, sociability, persuasiveness & resoluteness, empathy, and independence in order to be successful during small wars.¹¹⁴ The charts on the next pages show the same trend, and a majority of the respondents strongly agrees that these attributes are crucial for leaders in small wars.




Figure 4: Attributes adaptability, judgment, sociability, persuasiveness, empathy, independence.

The respondents' opinion regarding the importance of the attributes courage and risk-taking during small wars differs from the analysis of the case studies. The case studies clearly indicate that military leaders need more adeptness in physical and moral courage during small wars. The respondents to the questionnaire associate these attributes more with conventional war as is shown in the charts below.




Figure 5: Attributes courage and risk-taking.

During certain small wars such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief there is less risk, and therefore less need for physical courage. However, due to the characteristics of other types of small wars (stability operations, peace support operations) military leaders will regularly find themselves in positions where they need to show both moral and physical courage. Physical courage is needed because of the asymmetric threat and during kinetic engagements. There is an added level of complexity due to the ethical dilemma in deciding how much risk the military leader is willing to accept to his own forces in order to protect civilians or to achieve the mission. It requires leaders to have moral courage to deal with the ethical dilemmas of small wars. One of

the respondents was very clear about the absolute requirement for moral courage during small wars.

Coupled with judgment is moral courage. In stability operations, moral courage is also essential. If an officer does not have the courage to stand-up for that which is right, because it is right, he will fail in his duties as an officer and risk mission failure. Because stability operations, in some cases, are long, drawn out, and violent, someone without the moral courage to act may quickly find himself doing what he previously thought was unimaginable. Thus, there is premium on officers who possess both superior judgment and moral courage – I do not think you can separate the two in stability operations.¹¹⁵

This discord between the analysis of the case studies and the outcome of the questionnaire normally would require a follow up questionnaire to clarify the difference. However, a second questionnaire is not possible within the scope of this study. For the purpose of this study it is therefore assumed that the respondents associated courage and risk-taking more with conventional war because most people have a dominant mental picture of physical courage during actual combat.

Knowledge & experience

In retrospect ‘Knowledge & Experience’ is not an attribute but rather a skill, and perhaps should not have been included in the questionnaire. Military leaders can acquire knowledge in preparation for future operations, and via education and training they can prepare themselves and their subordinates for both small and conventional wars. Experience is something that every military professional will acquire throughout his career, however the relevance of that experience depends on timing and opportunity. However, the statistic of this attribute indicates that the majority of the respondents considers extensive knowledge and experience a crucial element for leaders in small wars.




Figure 6: Supporting skill knowledge & experience.

For example, throughout his whole career the Canadian general Roméo Dallaire had prepared for conventional war, and had no experience with peace support operations or any knowledge about the African continent when he was appointed the force commander of UNAMIR.¹¹⁶ In contrast, General David Petraeus had experience with peace support operations prior to his deployment to Iraq.¹¹⁷ He also had extensive knowledge about counterinsurgency; in 1987 he earned a doctorate in international relations at Princeton writing his dissertation about the American military and lessons of Vietnam.¹¹⁸ Petraeus used his knowledge and experience when he had to conduct a counterinsurgency operation in 2003 in Iraq and was one of the few successful and effective commanders at that time.¹¹⁹

Several of the respondents made specific remarks regarding the need for knowledge & experience, and some added additional attributes that related to knowledge & experience. Key words that the respondents used are history, culture, religion, and language. Due to the complex nature of the human terrain during small wars it is absolutely crucial to create situational understanding, and the only way to facilitate that process is to have in depth knowledge about the

history, culture, and religion of the area of operations. Having a basic knowledge of the local language will facilitate the interaction and communication with translators and key leaders.

Experience also provides the military leader with an advantage. Significant leadership experience will give the leader the respect from his subordinates, and it also gives him insight to his weaknesses and strengths. Experience with small wars will increase the likelihood that the he already has developed his leadership skills, and is more likely to be superior in the crucial attributes for small wars. In short, although knowledge & experience are not actual leadership attributes, these skills will influence the effectiveness and success of a military leader. The development of knowledge and experience can therefore be considered as supporting factors to successful leadership during small wars.

Endnotes

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- ¹ Siekmann, Robert C.R., The fall of Srebrenica and the attitude of Dutchbat from an international legal perspective. *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, page 312.
- ² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (11 August 2011), page V-1.
- ³ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual*. FMFRP 12-15 Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 22 December 1990), page 1.
- ⁴ Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*. Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), page 87.
- ⁵ Stodgedill, R.M., *Handbook of leadership: A survey of theory and research* (New York: Free Press, 1974), page 7.
- ⁶ Northouse, Peter G., *Leadership: theory and practice*. Sixth edition. (Washington DC: Sage Publications, Inc., 2013), page 28.
- ⁷ Northouse, page 20.
- ⁸ Krulak, Charles C., The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three-Block War. *Leatherneck* 82, no. 1 (1999), page 14.
- ⁹ Krulak, Charles C., page 14.
- ¹⁰ Krulak, Charles C., page 16.
- ¹¹ Jackson, Mike, *Soldier. The autobiography of General Sir Mike Jackson* (London: Transworld Publishers, 2007), page 212.
- ¹² Rose, Michael, *Fighting for peace: Bosnia 1994* (London: The Harvill Press, 1998), page 111.
- ¹³ These nineteen attributes are: empathy, initiative, independence, judgment, intelligence, courage (moral & physical), adaptability, persuasiveness, determination, self-confidence, knowledge & experience, risk-taking, respect, ethics, commitment, integrity, sociability, personality (charisma), decisiveness. See the questionnaire in Appendix C.
- ¹⁴ There is a discord between the analysis of the case studies and the respondents to the questionnaire with regards to the attribute courage. The respondents associate courage (and risk-taking) more with conventional war, where the case studies clearly indicate that physical and moral courage are crucial attributes for military leaders during small wars. This discord will be analyzed in more depth in paragraph 3.5 and Appendix E. This discord would normally require a follow up to clarify the difference; however, a second questionnaire is not possible within the scope of this study.
- ¹⁵ Interview with a Major from the Royal Marines (via questionnaire) by Ivo D.L. Moerman, December 19, 2012.
- ¹⁶ Moyar, Mark. *A question of command. Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), page 8 and 9.
- ¹⁷ Phillips, Donald T., and Adm. James M. Loy. *The Architecture of leadership. Preparation equals performance* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), page 45.
- ¹⁸ Petraeus, David, H., "Learning counterinsurgency: Observations from soldiering in Iraq." *Military Review*, Volume 86, No. 1 (January/February 2006), page 2-12. General Petraeus wrote this article after he returned from his second tour in Iraq. According to Thomas Ricks in his book *Fiasco*, he was the most successful commander on the ground in launching an effective counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq as the commander of the 101st Airborne in 2003.
- ¹⁹ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual*. FMFRP 12-15 (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 22 December 1990), page 9.
- ²⁰ Moyar, Mark, page 9.
- ²¹ Jackson, Mike, pages 221 and 235.
- ²² Jackson, Mike, page 236.
- ²³ Jackson, Mike, page 262.
- ²⁴ Jackson, Mike, page 270.
- ²⁵ Jackson, Mike, page 272.
- ²⁶ Jackson, Mike, page 280. Also see Jackson's analogy of the rope on page 5.
- ²⁷ Moyar, Mark, page 9.
- ²⁸ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual*. FMFRP 12-15 (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 22 December 1990), page 9.
- ²⁹ Smith, Rupert, *The utility of force. The art of war in the modern world* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), page 390.
- ³⁰ Smith, Rupert, page 374.
- ³¹ Petraeus, David, H., page 2-12.

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- ³² The actual cause of the crash has never been determined.
- ³³ Mackenzie, Lewis, *Soldiers made me look good. A life in the shadow of war* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre Ltd., 2008), page 227.
- ³⁴ MacKenzie, Lewis, page 228.
- ³⁵ Woods, Larry J., and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, "Military interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons from a failed state." Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (May 2008), page 61.
- ³⁶ Woods, Larry J., page 64.
- ³⁷ Woods Larry J., page 77.
- ³⁸ Phillips, Donald T., page 69.
- ³⁹ Phillips, Donald T., page 69.
- ⁴⁰ Seiler, Stefan, and Anders Pfister, "Coping with complexity – Preparing military leaders for an interlinked world," in *Developing the next generation of military leaders*, eds. Julie Bélanger and Psalm Lew (Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2011), page 96.
- ⁴¹ Petraeus, David, H., page 2-12.
- ⁴² Isberg, Jan-Gunnar, and Lotta Victor Tillberg. Translated by Stephen Henly. *By all necessary means. Brigadier General Jan-Gunnar Isberg's experiences from service in the Congo 2003-2005* (Sweden: Svenskt Militärhistoriskt Biblioteks Förlag, 2011), page 38.
- ⁴³ Isberg, Jan-Gunnar, page 68.
- ⁴⁴ Jackson, Mike, page 283.
- ⁴⁵ National Institute for War Documentation, *Srebrenica. A Safe area. Reconstruction, background, consequences, and analyses of the fall of a 'safe' area* (Amsterdam (Netherlands): Boom, 2002), page 1847.
- ⁴⁶ Vin, P.J. de, "Srebrenica: The impossible choices of a commander." Master's thesis (Marine Corps University, 6 March 2008), page 8.
- ⁴⁷ National Institute for War Documentation, page 1844.
- ⁴⁸ National Institute for War Documentation, page 1847.
- ⁴⁹ Vin, P.J. de, page 19 and 23.
- ⁵⁰ Vin, P.J. de, page 11. In addition Dutchbat III had very limited reliable intelligence. The Civil-Military-Affairs section was in regular contact with the civilian, military, and non-governmental actors in the area, but they were not properly trained, only had limited assets, and had no clue what their mission was.
- ⁵¹ Smith, Rupert, page 348.
- ⁵² Rose, Michael, page 33.
- ⁵³ Smith, Rupert, page 363.
- ⁵⁴ Smith, Rupert, page 351.
- ⁵⁵ Rose, Michael, page 50.
- ⁵⁶ Rose, Michael, page 51.
- ⁵⁷ Rose, Michael, page 137.
- ⁵⁸ Rose, Michael, page 117. General Rose states that the traditional peacekeeping weapons patience, persuasion, and persistence are more appropriate than bullets.
- ⁵⁹ Hawkins, Jon, "Perspectives on leadership development in the Australian Defence Force," in *Developing the next generation of military leaders*, eds. Julie Bélanger and Psalm Lew (Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2011), page 127.
- ⁶⁰ National Institute for War Documentation, page 2847.
- ⁶¹ Honig, Jan Willem, and Norbert Both, *Srebrenica. Record of a war crime* (New York: Penguin Books (U.S.A.), 1997), page 31. There is also the apocryphal story that Karremans was confronted with the scene of a Serb soldier slitting the throat of a pig. Mladic reportedly told him "that was how he would treat people like those protected by the Dutch peacekeepers."
- ⁶² Honig, Jan Willem, page 31.
- ⁶³ National Institute for War Documentation, page 1888.
- ⁶⁴ Westerman, Frank, and Bart Rijs, *Srebrenica: Het zwartste scenario* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Atlas, 1997), page 165.
- ⁶⁵ Kidder, Rushworth M., *Moral courage* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2005), page 26.
- ⁶⁶ Kidder, Rushworth M., page 72.
- ⁶⁷ Kidder, Rushworth M. Page 70.
- ⁶⁸ Rose, Michael, page 119.
- ⁶⁹ Phillips, Donald T., page 41.

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- ⁷⁰ Sewall, Sarah, "Leading warriors in the long war," in *Military Leadership. In pursuit of excellence*, eds. Robert L. Taylor, and William E. Rosenbach, and Eric B. Rosenbach (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), page 130.
- ⁷¹ Interview with a Lieutenant Colonel from the United States Marine Corps (via questionnaire) by Ivo D.L. Moerman, January 1, 2013.
- ⁷² Smith, Rupert, page 359.
- ⁷³ Rose, Michael, page 21.
- ⁷⁴ Rose, Michael, page 143.
- ⁷⁵ Vin, P.J. de, page 31 and 32.
- ⁷⁶ Vin, P.J. de, page 18. The prejudice that Dutchbat was not able to defend the enclave was very strong, despite the fact that the battalion had several heavy (6), medium (18), and light anti-tank weapons. In addition the battalion had heavy and medium machineguns. Finally, NATO air power also could provide considerable firepower to UN forces.
- ⁷⁷ National Institute for War Documentation, page 1639.
- ⁷⁸ Vin, P.J. de, page 16.
- ⁷⁹ Interview with a General from the Royal Netherlands Marine Corp (via questionnaire) by Ivo D.L. Moerman, January 3, 2013.
- ⁸⁰ Goleman, Daniel, "What makes a leader?" in *Military leadership – In pursuit of excellence*, eds. Robert L. Taylor, and William E. Rosenbach, and Eric B. Rosenbach (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), page 48.
- ⁸¹ Goleman, Daniel, page 49.
- ⁸² Ricks, Thomas E., page 228.
- ⁸³ Ricks, Thomas E., page 229.
- ⁸⁴ Interview with a Major from the French Marines by Ivo D.L. Moerman, January 7, 2013.
- ⁸⁵ Hawkins, Jon, page 127.
- ⁸⁶ MacKenzie, Lewis, *Soldiers made me look good. A life in the shadow of war* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre Ltd., 2008), page 219.
- ⁸⁷ "David Petraeus," Wikipedia, last modified February 12, 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Petraeus. General David Petraeus was deployed to Haiti for the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in 1995 and served a ten-month tour in Bosnia from 2001 until 2002 with the NATO Stabilization Force.
- ⁸⁸ Ricks, Thomas E., *Fiasco. The American military adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), page 228.
- ⁸⁹ Ricks, Thomas E., page 227.
- ⁹⁰ Tse-Tung, Mao, *Guerrilla Warfare*, Translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1961), page 33.
- ⁹¹ Moyer, Mark, page 243.
- ⁹² Stodgedill, R.M., *Handbook of leadership: A survey of theory and research* (New York: Free Press, 1974), page 7.
- ⁹³ Phillips, Donald T., and Adm. James M. Loy, *The Architecture of leadership. Preparation equals performance* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), page ix.
- ⁹⁴ Kolenda, Christopher D., "What is leadership? Some classical ideas," in *Leadership: The warrior's art*, ed. Christopher D. Kolenda (Carlisle: The Army War College Foundation Press, 2001), page 4.
- ⁹⁵ Clausewitz, page 112.
- ⁹⁶ Northouse, Peter G., *Leadership: theory and practice*. Sixth edition (Washington DC: Sage Publications, Inc., 2013), page 28.
- ⁹⁷ Northouse, page 20.
- ⁹⁸ Northouse, page 21. Stogdill in 1948, Mann in 1959, Stogdill in 1974, Lord, DeVader and Alliger in 1986, Kirkpatrick and Locke in 1992, and Zaccaro, Kemp, and Bader in 2004.
- ⁹⁹ Northouse, page 23.
- ¹⁰⁰ Phillips, Donald T., page ix.
- ¹⁰¹ Phillips, Donald T., page 28.
- ¹⁰² Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Leading Marines*, FMFM 1-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 3 January 1995), page 103.
- ¹⁰³ Fox, COL Wesley L., *Six essential elements of leadership. Marine Corps wisdom of a Medal of Honor recipient* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011), page 33.
- ¹⁰⁴ "Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR," United Nations Department of Public Information, last modified August 31, 1996, https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_p.htm.
- ¹⁰⁵ "Rwanda – UNAMIR," United Nations Department of Public Information, last modified in 2001, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamir.htm>.

¹⁰⁶ “The democratic Republic of the Congo – MONUC,” United Nations Peacekeeping Department, accessed on February 10, 2013, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/>.

¹⁰⁷ “UNAMSIL, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,” United Nations Department of Public Information, last modified in 2009, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/>.

¹⁰⁸ Hawkins, Jon, “Perspectives on leadership development in the Australian Defence Force,” in *Developing the next generation of military leaders*, eds. Julie Bélanger and Psalm Lew (Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2011), 127 – 133.

¹⁰⁹ Used acronyms: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Counterinsurgency (COIN), and Maritime Security Operations (MSO).

¹¹⁰ Remark from the author: For future research the questionnaire should be augmented with a fourth question or statement: “Military leaders require to be more adept in certain leadership attributes for small wars.”

¹¹¹ Interview with a Major from the British Royal Marines (via questionnaire) by Ivo D.L. Moerman, December 19, 2012.

¹¹² Interview with a Brigadier General from the United States Marine Corps (via questionnaire) by Ivo D.L. Moerman, January 7, 2013.

¹¹³ In retrospect ‘Knowledge & Experience’ is not an attribute but rather a skill, and should not have been included in the questionnaire. The relevance of this skill and its supporting value for military leadership will be analyzed on page E-9.

¹¹⁴ There is a discord between the analysis of the case studies and the respondents to the questionnaire with regards to the attribute courage. The respondents associate courage (and risk-taking) more with conventional war, where the case studies clearly indicate that physical and moral courage are crucial attributes for military leaders during small wars. This discord will be analyzed in more depth in on page E-8. This discord would normally require a follow up to clarify the difference; however, a second questionnaire is not possible within the scope of this study.

¹¹⁵ Interview with a Lieutenant-Colonel from the United States Marine Corps (via questionnaire) by Ivo D.L. Moerman, January 1, 2013.

¹¹⁶ MacKenzie, Lewis, *Soldiers made me look good. A life in the shadow of war* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre Ltd., 2008), page 219.

¹¹⁷ “David Petraeus,” Wikipedia, last modified February 12, 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Petraeus. General David Petraeus was deployed to Haiti for the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in 1995 and served a ten-month tour in Bosnia from 2001 until 2002 with the NATO Stabilization Force.

¹¹⁸ Ricks, Thomas E., *Fiasco. The American military adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), page 228.

¹¹⁹ Ricks, Thomas E., page 227.